

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200090006-1

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px;"></div>		
2			
3			
4			

Remarks:

Frank:

Since we are not asking that your Memorandum of Understanding be changed prior to its being sent to the Director and because we think the Director should give serious consideration to his full role in crisis management, we ask that a copy of this memorandum to you be included in the package being sent to the Director.



FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE
Sayre Stevens		9 May 1978
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67

237

Use previous editions

GPO : 1969 O - 257-542

(40)

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

9 MAY 1978

X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

Deputy Director for Collection Tasking

FROM : Robert R. Bowie
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

SUBJECT : NITC Operations in the Pentagon

1. In response to your request, we have prepared comments on the draft DCI/DoD agreement. You should be aware that at no time did your officers consult with NFAC in preparing it. This probably accounts for the difficulties we have with it.

2. We concur with the proposition that your detachment should be established with the functions specified in your Paragraph 4, although some recognition of the role of NFAC as the DCI's substantive staff would be desirable. We also concur with the location of this unit in conjunction with the DIA Collection Coordination Facility. The economies and efficiencies in such an arrangement are great, and it provides a sensible way for the DCI to meet his obligation to turn the tasking function over to the SecDef, should that be required.

3. We do have a problem, however, with the concept of the DCI's role and responsibilities in crisis that appear to underlie this paper. It comes through more in the implications of what is said, and in what is not said, than in the specifics of the proposal itself. I believe you and I should move to develop a common understanding of these matters before we proceed much further.

4. We see the DCI, as the President's senior intelligence adviser, as having the following responsibilities in a crisis situation:

- to participate in NSC/SCC deliberations;
- to provide intelligence analyses needed by the NSC/SCC;

- to provide periodic situation reporting to the NSC/SCC;
- to adjust the deployment of intelligence collection resources; and,
- to conduct CA and PM operations when called for.

In our long experience, at least 80% of the DCI's involvement in crisis management has related to the first three of these responsibilities. The fourth is equally important, but it requires a series of specific actions which, while often needing extensive staffing, are quickly completed and remain in effect for the duration of the crisis. In other words, the DCI's involvement is sporadic and unstructured, while the analytic side of his duties requires his continuous and deep attention. On a few occasions, the fifth has taken much attention, but covert action is relevant to this discussion only as discussed in Paragraph 5.


5. Moreover, the DCI's primary responsibility is to the President and the NSC, not to the "National Command Authorities." The DCI does have responsibilities for support of the NCA and the senior commands, but he can discharge these through his support of the NSC -- on which both SecDef and Chairman, JCS sit -- through his own channels directly to the commands, and laterally through DIA. The linking of the DCI to the NCA would effectively exclude the Department of State, Dr. Brzezinski and his staff, and CIA from participation. We have repeatedly over the years attempted to focus national attention on this anomaly in DoD planning. It assumes that, in the culminating stages of a crisis, the President will want to receive his advice from the military authorities whose attention is concentrated on the need to fight the war should it occur, and not from the civilian authorities who may still see an opportunity to avoid hostilities. Such an assumption is reflected in the DoD's various emergency relocation plans for the President. They provide a desk for the DCI, but do not provide him with supporting staff or with communications to his organizational base. Thus the distinction between NSC and NCA is not a small one.

6. If our experience as to what is expected of the DCI in crisis remains valid, he will have to draw his analytic support primarily from NFAC. In crises, DIA and INR are submerged in departmental concerns, and only the resources of CIA are available and prepared to serve the DCI. Yet your proposal seems to assume that the DCI's post in crisis would be in the CCF. It would make him dependent on DIA, as a secondary consumer of DIA's analytic support, and would deprive the DCI of his ability to play an effective role in the NSC and in support of the President. In our experience again, both State and Defense have been much more willing to furnish sensitive information

to the DCI at Langley than either has been to furnish such traffic to the other. The DCI should also be severely handicapped by separation from DDO, should covert action be required. In any case, the bulk of his support will come from Langley.

7. A secondary consideration is that you would probably profit from consultation with Jack Blake and his communications people, to make sure that your arrangements are compatible with his commitments to support of the DCI.

8. Finally, the NITC-CCF activity should be planned to fit into the DCI's overall organization for crisis and for "warning." As you know, Dick Lehman is chairing a working group, on which you are represented, to come up with recommendations on this broader organizational question.



Robert R. Bowie

25

2 MAY 1978

Executive Registry

78-5467

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence


FROM:

SUBJECT: DCI-DoD Agreement on NITC Pentagon Operations

1. Attached for your review is a draft Memorandum of Agreement intended to cover the operations and support of the NITC warning and crisis management element operating in the Pentagon with the CCF. The key paragraphs for your consideration are 2-4, 5 and 8; the remainder deal with nuts and bolts. In paragraph 8, we are stating the requirement for JCS to advise you concerning military operations, options under consideration.

obviously an ongoing process with frequent iterations

2. One of my people is now discussing our objectives and support requirements with DIA on a low key, informal basis. If you find the attached draft satisfactory, I will undertake to negotiate it with Dan Murphy, also on an informal basis in order to avoid exciting Congressional sensitivities at this time.



25X

Attachment:
Memorandum of Agreement (Draft)

APPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

DISAPPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: DCI-DoD Agreement on NITC Pentagon Operations

Distribution:

Orig - Adse, return to CT

1 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - D/NFAC

1 - ER

1 - D/DCI/CT

1 - AD/DCI/CT

1 - AC/PAID/OPEI

1 - RM/CT Registry

5X1 IC/OPEI/PAID

(2 May 78)

REVISED DRAFT: 4/28/78

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENTPREAMBLE

1. This memorandum of agreement addresses the mission, functions, and operational support of the warning and crisis management element of the National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC). This element will be based in the Pentagon and will utilize facilities and support services provided by the Department of Defense as specified below. When appropriate, however, it may shift the focus of its operations to the facilities of other Intelligence Community agencies for the duration of a particular warning or crisis situation.

AGREEMENT OBJECTIVES

2. The purpose of this agreement is to establish and maintain operational procedures and mechanisms for assuring effective and efficient use of all source intelligence collection, processing and dissemination resources in support of National decisionmaking and command authorities with respect to:

a. warning of foreign activities and intentions inimical to U.S. security or interests which could require the alerting and deployment of U.S. military forces;

b. management of international crises involving the potential or actual employment of major U.S. military forces in a contingency or combat role;

c. warning and crisis management situations other than the above, requiring DCI support of the President and the Special

Coordinating Committee;

WORKING PAPER

d. support of the tactical information needs of U.S. military forces deployed in response to international crisis management requirements; and

e. advisory tasking of appropriate Department of Defense resources by the DCI as necessary to discharge his responsibilities as principal intelligence advisor to the President and the Special Coordinating Committee.

NITC ELEMENT-FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

3. The NITC warning and crisis management element will consist of a small permanent staff headed by a National Intelligence Tasking Officer (NITO). The element will be staffed and operated by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Pre-established procedures and periodic exercises, will provide for rapid and flexible DCI augmentation of staff resources in response to developing warning and crisis management situations.

4. The NITO and his staff will perform the following specific functions with respect to the operational warning and crisis management contexts described in the preceding section:

a. discharge, as immediate representative of the Director, National Intelligence Tasking Center, the responsibilities set forth in Subsection 1-502 of Executive Order 12036 to include:

WORKING PAPER

- (1) translation of national foreign intelligence requirements into specific collection objectives and targets;
 - (2) assignment of targets and objectives to collection organizations and systems through established collection system management mechanisms;
 - (3) assurance of timely processing and dissemination of intelligence collected;
 - (4) advisory tasking of non-NFIP departments and agencies which have information collection capabilities or intelligence assets;
- b. develop and coordinate, in conjunction with other elements of the NITC, implementation of multidisciplinary collection plans designed to optimize intelligence collection coverage;
 - c. provide timely support to the DCI concerning the status, capabilities, tasking and information yield of applicable intelligence collection resources;
 - d. establish and maintain facilities and procedures for rapid and efficient augmentation of the element's staff and operations during periods of rising international tension and crisis management;
 - e. conduct periodic training exercises for NITC personnel, in conjunction with DIA and appropriate Intelligence Community, agencies and operational and policy staffs, to assure operations in periods of tension and crisis;
 - f. participate with Intelligence Community agencies and operational and policy staffs in the development and implementation

of systems and procedures, intended to enhance the effective use of National intelligence collection resources for indications and warning and crisis management purposes, such as the Warning Improvement Study and Plan (WISP);

g. participate, with appropriate DoD elements, in development and periodic exercise of procedures to effect orderly transfer to DoD, as provided for in Subsection 1-504 of Executive Order 12036.

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

5. To insure effective operational interaction and efficient use of personnel resources, the NITC warning and crisis management element will be directly supported by the present Collection Coordination Facility (CCF), operated by DIA as a joint DoD-DCI entity. As a result the DCI or his designate will file a concurrent performance rating on the Chief of that Facility. To the maximum feasible extent, the two organizations will develop common procedures, information displays and reporting vehicles for use in providing support to the DCI, the JCS and senior DoD authorities in warning and crisis management situations.

6. DIA will provide the NITO and the NITC element all-source substantive intelligence support to include direct dissemination of incoming message traffic and hard copy reporting, consultative access to desk level analysts, intelligence collection specialists and watch personnel and direct access to data bases and automated data systems available to the NMIC. This support will be expanded, as required, to meet the requirements of the DCI and an augmented NITC element during periods of active crisis management.

7. The NITO and members of the NITC element's permanent staff will be authorized direct access to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) for the purpose of conducting liaison necessary to effective coordination of intelligence collection operations relating to warning and crisis management situations.

8. The Joint Staff will provide the DCI timely advice concerning operations under consideration regarding alerting, movement or engagement of U.S. forces in connection with incipient and active international crisis situations in order to permit appropriate adjustment of intelligence operations and support. Normally, the DCI will be advised on the day preceding a scheduled SCC meeting of operational courses of action under consideration for submission to the SCC and given timely notification of changes made in the interim. The DCI will accord this information the same level of security protection as that assigned within the Department of Defense.

OPERATING FACILITIES

9. The Department of Defense will make available for use by the NITC enclosed working (office) space of approximately 800 contiguous square feet within the NMIC and adjacent to the CCF, to include an office suitable for the DCI's personal use during crisis management situations. DoD will provide, on a reimbursable basis, technical and support services necessary to installation and maintenance of equipment and other furnishings required for NITC element operations and direct support to the DCI.

10. In addition, DoD will provide supplementary working space on a temporary basis when required for augmentation of the NITC element by the DCI during periods of expanded operations resulting from increased international tensions and active crisis management. Such space will accommodate up to five people and will be located in the immediate vicinity of the CCF and permanent NITC element spaces. Joint use with a DIA task force focused on the same operational context will meet this requirement. DCI personnel serving as crisis augmentees will be provided the same support services and facilities during their tenure as the permanent NITC element staff.

11. DoD will provide the NITC element, on a reimbursable basis, consumable supplies and services necessary to the conduct of day-to-day operations.

COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT

12. Working spaces provided the NITC will be equipped with telephone lines and instruments sufficient to insure efficient communications. Non-secure telephone lines will provide access to AUTOVON; secure telephone lines to the NSA gray system and AUTOSEVOCOM. A ring-down extension to the NMIC NOIWON terminal will be installed.

13. The NMIC Support System will be employed as the primary means for disseminating substantive intelligence and relevant operational and administrative message traffic to the NITC element. Three UNIVAC 1652 terminals and a printer will be installed by DIA in the NITC element working spaces and provided the same operating capabilities as similar terminals installed elsewhere in NMIC, including INDICOM access.

14. The record ~~co~~munications facility serving DIA will provide message center services for incoming and outgoing messages addressed to and originated by the NITC element (NITO). The DCI will establish a discrete tele~~co~~munications routing indicator for this purpose.